Trust constitutes a fundamental strategy to deal with risks and uncertainty in complex societies. In line with the vast literature stressing the importance of trust in doctor–patient relationships, trust is therefore regularly suggested as a way of dealing with the risks of medical artificial intelligence (AI). Yet, this approach has come under charge from different angles. At least two lines of thought can be distinguished: (1) that trusting AI is conceptually confused, that is, that we cannot trust AI; and (2) (...) that it is also dangerous, that is, that we should not trust AI—particularly if the stakes are as high as they routinely are in medicine. In this paper, we aim to defend a notion of trust in the context of medical AI against both charges. To do so, we highlight the technically mediated intentions manifest in AI systems, rendering trust a conceptually plausible stance for dealing with them. Based on literature from human–robot interactions, psychology and sociology, we then propose a novel model to analyse notions of trust, distinguishing between three aspects: reliability, competence, and intentions. We discuss each aspect and make suggestions regarding how medical AI may become worthy of our trust. (shrink)

Introduction for 'New Developments in Cognitive Science of Religion - The Rationality of Religious Belief' forthcoming with Springer. We discuss the philosophical debate over Cognitive Science of Religion and give an outline of the book.

Cognitive Science of Religion is still a rather young discipline. Depending on what one deems to be the first paper or book in the field, the discipline is now almost forty or almost thirty years old. Philosophical and theological discussion on CSR started in the late 2000s. From its onset, the main focus has been the epistemic consequences of CSR, and this focus is dominant even today. Some of those involved in the debate discussed the relevance of CSR for further (...) issues in philosophy of religion, and other have examined how CSR weighs in on various theological questions. Finally, a small number of philosophers offered criticisms or support for various CSR-theories. In this chapter, we give an overview of the debates so far and provide an outline of the book. (shrink)

It is widely thought that the cognitive science of religion may have a bearing on the epistemic status of religious beliefs and on other topics in philosophy of religion. Epistemologists have used theories from CSR to argue both for and against the rationality of religious beliefs, or they have claimed that CSR is neutral vis-à-vis the epistemic status of religious belief. However, since CSR is a rapidly evolving discipline, a great deal of earlier research on the topic has become dated. (...) Furthermore, most of the debate on the epistemic consequences of CSR has not taken into account insights from the philosophy of science, such as explanatory pluralism and explanatory levels. This volume overcomes these deficiencies. This volume brings together new philosophical reflection on CSR. It examines the influence of CSR theories on the epistemic status of religious beliefs; it discusses its impact on philosophy of religion; and it offers new insights for CSR. The book addresses the question of whether or not the plurality of theories in CSR makes epistemic conclusions about religious belief unwarranted. It also explores the impact of CSR on other topics in philosophy of religion like the cognitive consequences of sin and naturalism. Finally, the book investigates what the main theories in CSR aim to explain, and addresses the strengths and weaknesses of CSR. (shrink)

This paper explores the relation between evolutionary explanations of religious belief and a core idea in both classical Christian theology and Reformed Epistemology, namely that humans have fallen into sin. In particular, it challenges the claim made by De Cruz and De Smedt that ‘ in the light of current evolutionary and cognitive theories, the Reformed epistemological view of NES [the noetic effects of sin] is in need of revision.’ Three possible solutions to this conundrum are examined, two of which (...) are shown to be plausible. (shrink)

Even in the Netherlands, where the practice of physician-assisted death (PAD) has been legalized for over 20 years, there is no such thing as a ‘right to die’. Especially patients with extraordinary requests, such as a wish for PAD based on psychiatric suffering, advanced dementia, or (a limited number of) multiple geriatric syndromes, encounter barriers in access to PAD. In this paper, we discuss whether these barriers can be justified in the context of the Dutch situation where PAD is legally (...) permitted for those who suffer unbearably and hopelessly as a result of medical conditions. Furthermore, we explore whether there are options to address some of the barriers or their consequences, both within the Dutch legal framework or by adjusting the legal framework, and whether these options are feasible. We conclude that although there are insufficient arguments to overrule the doctor’s freedom of conscience in the Netherlands, there are ways to address some of the barriers, mainly by offering support to doctors that would be willing to support a request. Moreover, we believe it is morally required to reduce or mitigate where possible the negative consequences of the barriers for patients, such as the long waiting time for those who suffer from psychiatric disorders, because it is unlikely the adjustments suggested to the system will ensure reasonable access for these patient groups. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

In the present paper I investigate the role that analogy plays in eighteenth-century biology and in Kant’s philosophy of biology. I will argue that according to Kant, biology, as it was practiced in the eighteenth century, is fundamentally based on analogical reflection. However, precisely because biology is based on analogical reflection, biology cannot be a proper science. I provide two arguments for this interpretation. First, I argue that although analogical reflection is, according to Kant, necessary to comprehend the nature of (...) organisms, it is also necessarily insufficient to fully comprehend the nature of organisms. The upshot of this argument is that for Kant our understanding of organisms is necessarily limited. Second, I argue that Kant did not take biology to be a proper science because biology was based on analogical arguments. I show that Kant stemmed from a philosophical tradition that did not assign analogical arguments an important justificatory role in natural science. Analogy, according to this conception, does not provide us with apodictically certain cognition. Hence, sciences based on analogical arguments cannot constitute proper sciences. (shrink)

Can only science deliver genuine knowledge about the world and ourselves? Is science our only guide to what exists? Scientism answers both questions with yes. Scientism is increasingly influential in popular scientific literature and intellectual life in general, but philosophers have hitherto largely ignored it. This collection is one of the first to develop and assess scientism as a serious philosophical position. It features twelve new essays by both proponents and critics of scientism. Before scientism can be evaluated, it needs (...) to be clear what it is. Hence, the collection opens with essays that provide an overview of the many different versions of scientism and their mutual interrelations. Next, several card-carrying proponents of scientism make their case, either by developing and arguing directly for their preferred version of scientism or by responding to objections. Then, the floor is given to critics of scientism. It is examined whether scientism is epistemically vicious, whether scientism presents a plausible general epistemological outlook and whether science has limits. The final four essays zoom out and connect scientism to ongoing debates elsewhere in philosophy. What does scientism mean for religious epistemology? What can science tell us about morality and is a scientistic moral epistemology plausible? How is scientism related to physicalism? And is experimental philosophy really a form of scientism tailored to philosophy? (shrink)

Are psychiatric disorders natural kinds? This question has received a lot of attention within present-day philosophy of psychiatry, where many authors debate the ontology and nature of mental disorders. Similarly, historians of psychiatry, dating back to Foucault, have debated whether psychiatric researchers conceived of mental disorders as natural kinds or not. However, historians of psychiatry have paid little to no attention to the influence of (a) theories within logic, and (b) theories within metaphysics on psychiatric accounts of proper method, and (...) on accounts of the nature and classification of mental disorders. Historically, however, logic and metaphysics have extensively shaped methods and interpretations of classifications in the natural sciences. This paper corrects this lacuna in the history of psychiatry, and demonstrates that theories within logic and metaphysics, articulated by Christian Wolff (1679-1754), have significantly shaped the conception of medical method and (psychiatric) nosology of the influential nosologist Boissier De Sauvages (1706-1767). After treating Sauvages, I discuss the method of the influential nosologist William Cullen (1710-1790), and demonstrate the continuity between the classificatory methods of Sauvages and Cullen. I show that both Sauvages and Cullen were essentialists concerning medical diseases in general and psychiatric disorders in particular, contributing to the history of conceptions of the ontology and nature of mental disorders. (shrink)

Women often embody the central values and practices of their religious tradition. When they leave their community, women find a part of the “religious tapestry” remaining with them long after their disengagement. In this article, we draw from research in the UK and Finland to explore women’s efforts to unlearn parts of their former religious belonging. We draw on in total thirty-five interviews with women who disengaged from the Mormon Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Conservative Laestadianism. We conceptualize un/learning as a (...) multi-layered process consisting of both un-learning and re-learning. We explore women’s narratives about negotiating bodily limits, conduct and belonging, and understand these as suggesting experiences of a threefold un/learning: gendered, spatial-social and epistemic. We argue that examining gendered and embodied un/learning helps to understand women’s disengagement processes from minority Christian traditions in Western and Northern European secularized contexts such as the UK and Finland. (shrink)

Vladimir Solov'ev (1853-1900- is regarded as the most original and systematic of the Russian philosophers in the 19th century. He has once again become the subject of international scholarly attention both in Slavic countries and the West. This volume contains selected papers presented at the international conference on Vladimir Solov'ev held at Nijmegen University, the Netherlands, in September 1998. The scope of this conference was wide-ranging, dealing with theological, metaphysical, philosophical and historical themes. Though Solov'ev's broad intellectual activity defies any (...) strict attempt at categorisation, the editors have classified its major themes under the dual characteristic of reconciliation and polemics. Solov'ev was passionately committed to the reconciliation of all beings under the idea of all-unity, which he attemted to achieve by engaging in uncompromising polemics with his contemporaries, The thirty contributors to this volume are specialists from Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Western Europe and the United States. The volume makes a significant contribution to the intellectual reassesment of Vladimir Solov'ev since the rediscovery of his philosophical heritage in his own homeland in the 1980s. (shrink)

This paper analyzes debates on animal language in eighteenth-century German philosophy and science. Adopting a history of ideas approach, I explain how the study of animal language became tied to the investigation into the origin and development of language towards the end of the eighteenth century. I argue that for large parts of the eighteenth century, the question of the existence of animal languages was studied within the context of the philosophical question of whether animals possess reason. In Germany, the (...) debate concerning animal reason was influenced by Christian Wolff and was taken up by diverse thinkers such as Winkler, Meier, and Reimarus. I argue that in the second half of the eighteenth century the study of animal language became more loosely related to the question of whether animals possess reason: animal language was studied not only in light of the debate on animal reason but also because it sheds light on the nature of animals, on the differences and similarities between animals and humans, and on the origin and development of language. This systematic study of animal language coincided with the rise of linguistics, anthropology, and biology as independent sciences. (shrink)

The literature on the epistemology of ignorance already discusses how certain forms of discrimination, such as racism and sexism, are perpetuated by the ignorance of individuals and groups. However, little attention has been given to how speciesism—a form of discrimination on the basis of species membership—is sustained through ignorance_._ Of the few animal ethicists who explicitly discuss ignorance, none have related this concept to speciesism as a form of discrimination. However, it is crucial to explore this connection, I argue, as (...) ignorance is both an integral part of the injustice done to animals as well as an obstacle to improving their treatment. In order to adequately criticize sustained structural speciesism and injustices towards animals, I develop an epistemological account of ‘speciesist ignorance’. I begin by defining and distinguishing between individual and group-based accounts of speciesist ignorance. I argue that humans, taken as a group, enjoy a position of privilege, which allows them to comfortably remain ignorant of their participation in collective wrongdoings towards animals. Additionally, I point out that speciesist ignorance is structurally encouraged and thereby maintains the dominant view that the human-animal-relationship, as it stands, is just. In sum, this article lays the groundwork for a social epistemology of speciesist ignorance. In particular, it informs further debate about individual and institutional epistemic duties to inquire into speciesism and to inform the public, about the moral culpability of ignorant actions, and about effective animal advocacy and policy which actively rejects speciesist ignorance. (shrink)

Degree-sentences, i.e. sentences that seem to refer to things that allow of degrees, are widely used both inside and outside of philosophy, even though the metaphysics of degrees is much of an untrodden field. This paper aims to fill this lacuna by addressing the following four questions: [A] Is there some one thing, such that it is degree sensitive? [B] Are there things x, y, and z that stand in a certain relation to each other, viz. the relation that x (...) has more y than z? [C] In those cases in which degree sentences do not refer to phenomena that are degree sensitive, what is responsible for their prima facie seeming to do so? [D] If there are degree sensitive things, to which ontological categories do they belong? We answer each of these questions by arguing that there are, metaphysically speaking, different phenomena that degree sentences refer to: some refer to determinates that emanate from a certain determinable, others to tokens that are instantiations of a certain type, and yet others to what we call ‘complex, resultant properties that are constituted by stereotypical properties’. (shrink)

Common-sense philosophy is important because it maintains that we can know many things about the world, about ourselves, about morality, and even about things of a metaphysical nature. The tenets of common-sense philosophy, while in some sense obvious and unsurprising, give rise to powerful arguments that can shed light on fundamental philosophical issues, including the perennial problem of scepticism and the emerging challenge of scientism. This Companion offers an exploration of common-sense philosophy in its many forms, tracing its development as (...) a concept and considering the roles it has been assigned to play throughout the history of philosophy. Containing fifteen newly commissioned chapters from leading experts in the history of philosophy, epistemology, the philosophy of science, moral philosophy and metaphysics, the volume will be an essential guide for students and scholars hoping to gain a greater understanding of the value and enduring appeal of common-sense philosophy. (shrink)

Dem hier präsentierten Band liegt die These zugrunde, daß die Anfänge der Praxis, kunstprogrammatische Texte als Manifest zu bezeichnen, und die anschließende Hoch-konjunktur in der avantgardistischen Nomenklatur vor dem Hintergrund der problematisch gewordenen Intentionalität im Dreieck Künstler, Kunstwerk und Publikum gesehen werden muß. Den Beleg dafür tritt der vorliegende Band von drei Ansätzen aus an: Interpretation, Funktionalität und Strategie. Dabei wird ein Korpus aus verschiedenen Kunstsparten behandelt, das von literarischen Deklarationen der russischen Moderne ab 1893 bis zu postmodernen Manifesten reicht, (...) mit einem besonderen Schwerpunkt auf den Manifesten der historischen Avantgarde. Damit ist das vorliegende Buch auch als ein Beitrag zur Historiographie der Bezeichnung von Texten der Avantgarde als Manifeste, der Rolle von Manifesten in der Avantgarde und letztlich auch der Textproduktion der Avantgarde insgesamt zu verstehen. (shrink)

There has been a time in my teaching career that I used to cite in my introductory classes ‘Moral Philosophy’ from Erica Jong's Fear of Flying . The situation leading up to the quote is that the main character, Isadora, is asked a sexual favour by her brother in law, Pierre. Her answer and the subsequent dialogue read then as follows: ‘I can't’ , I said. ‘Come on,’ Pierre said, ‘I'll teach you.’ ‘I didn't mean that … I meant that (...) I can't; morally , I can…’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Herman Daly’s Economics for a Full World: His Life and Ideas by Peter VictorJeroen Van Den Bergh (bio)Victor, Peter (2022). Herman Daly’s Economics for a Full World: His Life and Ideas. Routledge, Oxon UK and New York USA (ISBN: 978–0–367-55694-5).Herman Daly (1938–2022) spent a lifetime thinking about how to achieve a sustainable economy. In an inclusive biography, Canadian economist and environmental scientist Peter Victor discusses his ideas, critiques (...) and debates with others, while clarifying his motivations and struggles. Daly has greatly influenced others, as reflected by numerous prizes awarded to him. This influence is confirmed by original text boxes in the book that contain statements of many colleagues about his work and person, obtained through a questionnaire survey by the author.As a young man, Daly decided to study economics as he imagined it combined humanities and science. He was disappointed in it being less scientific than hoped, but his environmental concern motivated him to work on reestablishing the foundations of the field in environmental science and ethics. Daly is best known for his critique of economic growth and his alternative of the “steady-state economy.” He contributed, however, many other novel concepts and ideas during his lifetime, such as the ends-means spectrum, empty vs full world, uneconomic growth and optimal scale.Victor explains these ideas in a calm pace, showing a deep knowledge of Daly’s work. He, moreover, is able to connect it to ongoing sustainability research. He does all this in the course of thirteen chapters, covering Daly’s early life, education and career, his views on economics, his personal philosophy and the role of religion, his proposal for a steady-state economy, and his opinions on economic growth, population and migration, money and banking, and the perils of trade. [End Page 117]Ultimate endsMany consider Herman Daly to be a heterodox and even heretic economist. He associates himself with ecological economics, the field he co-founded. But while some of his ideas seem radical, many of his core proposals do not deviate substantially from mainstream economics. For instance, his “ultimate ends” concept is perfectly consistent with the broad notion of “welfare” in standard economics. In line with this, many welfare economists—such as Samuelson (1961), Mishan (1967), Hirsch (1976), Sen (1976), Scitovsky (1976) and Frank (1985)—have expressed themselves as critical of GDP (gross domestic product) dominance and growthmania (van den Bergh 2009). In fact, neoclassical economics is not married to economic growth—this is more the empirical side of macroeconomics. While Daly recognizes these subtleties, some of his followers do not.Daly sees his Protestant religion as delivering the ultimate ends, but Victor notes that this has not led to concrete suggestions. Ultimate ends based in Christian religion may be motivated by the promise of eternal (after)life, which in effect means gratifying selfish preferences. Instead, a humanistic perspective—which Daly also seems to embrace—would stress solidarity with future generations and a bioethical view of solidarity with other species. These distinct viewpoints, combined with diversity of human preferences and experiences, suggest that it will be difficult if not impossible for democratic societies to agree upon ultimate means.The Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW), a kind of greened or sustainable GDP metric, is Daly’s most concrete elaboration of ultimate means (Daly and Cobb 1989). For many OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, it indicates a stabilization of welfare, despite continued GDP growth (Lawn 2003; Posner and Costanza 2011). As clarified by Victor, The ISEW remains close to GDP, produces a monetary measure, has a simple and transparent calculation method, and received considerably attention from theoretical and empirical angles. In view of this, it may well represent the best candidate for a beyond-GDP metric that can replace the GDP. What urgently fails is an effective institutional procedure to achieve its widespread adoption (van den Bergh 2022).Religion, evolution and biodiversityDaly’s religious standpoint make him skeptical of the modern scientific worldview which regards the world to be governed by materialism and evolution, with no role for a higher purpose or an ultimate end. This led him... (shrink)

Dit boek is gewijd aan een nadere reflectie van deze actuele kruisbestuivingen. Naast het sublieme en het sacrale in het beeld en de architectuur, het belang van de stilte in de muziek, wordt de mystieke ervaring onder meer bij Meister Eckhart en de Japanse zenmeester Dogen geëxploreerd. De auteur bekijkt ook waar de westerse mystiek en zen elkaar raken. Met 'De stilte en het onuitsprekelijke' heeft Antoon Van den Braembussche een actueel en levensnoodzakelijk boek geschreven, een boek dat bovendien de (...) belichaming is van een nieuw paradigma in de filosofie waarin de non-dualiteit centraal staat. (shrink)

Ce livre a pour objet principal de décrire le sport en tant qu’art de vivre. L’art de vivre pose la question de la vie bonne, du sens, de la qualité de vie. Jadis, les Hellènes en avaient déjà soulevé l’importance d’un point de vue philosophique et pratique. Ainsi, la quête de cette vie bonne n’est possible que si elle prends en compte la dimension du soin du corps. Notre tradition occidentale a trop souvent éliminé la corporéité, le besoin de prendre (...) soin de son corps. Les maladies actuelles de la civilisation (stress, dépressions,...) en sont la preuve. Or, le corps est notre manière primaire d’être-dans-le-monde. L’art de vivre est également synonyme d’harmonie, de juste mesure, de dialogue avec l’environnement. Le sport en tant qu’art de vivre n’a pour dire pas de but; il est le but. Ce qui compte, ce n’est pas de penser en termes de quantité ou d’efficacité, mais en termes de qualité, de bien-être. La manière dont Marc Van den Bossche aborde le sport en tant qu’art de vivre est novatrice. En effet, rares sont les auteurs qui ont présenté l’art de vivre avec cette dimension du soin du corps, ou bien le sport nécessite de performances. (shrink)

There is widespread understanding of the close connection between religion and the ecological crisis, and that in order to amend this crisis, theological resources are needed. This monograph seeks to contribute to this endeavor by engaging the theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. His theology is particularly suitable in this context, due to its open-ended nature, and to the prophetic and radical nature of the questions he was prepared to ask--that is why there are many other attempts to contextualize Bonhoeffer's theology in (...) areas that he himself has not directly written about. In this monograph, Steven van den Heuvel first of all addresses the question of how to translate Bonhoeffer's theology in a methodologically sound way. He settles on a modified form of the general method of correlation. Then, secondly, van den Heuvel sets out to describe five major concepts in Bonhoeffer's work, bringing these into critical interplay with discussions in environmental ethics and eco-theology. In making the correlations he thoroughly describes each concept, situating it in the historic and intellectual background of Bonhoeffer's time. He then transposes these concepts to contemporary environmental ethics, describing what contribution Bonhoeffer's theology can make. - back of book. (shrink)

The History of Ideas is presently enjoying a certain renaissance after a long period of disrepute. Increasing quantities of digitally available historical texts and the availability of computational tools for the exploration of such masses of sources, it is suggested, can be of invaluable help to historians of ideas. The question is: how exactly? In this paper, we argue that a computational history of ideas is possible if the following two conditions are satisfied: (i) Sound Method . A computational history (...) of ideas must be built upon a sound theoretical foundation for its methodology, and the only such foundation is given by the use of models , i.e., fully explicit and revisable interpretive frameworks or networks of concepts developed by the historians of ideas themselves. (ii) Data Organisation. Interpretive models in our sense must be seen as topic-specific knowledge organisation systems (KOS) implementable (i.e. formalisable) as e.g. computer science ontologies. We thus require historians of ideas to provide explicitly structured semantic framing of domain knowledge before investigating texts computationally, and to constantly re-input findings from the interpretive point of view. In this way, a computational history of ideas maximally profits from computer methods while also keeping humanities experts in the loop. We elucidate our proposal with reference to a model of the notion of axiomatic science in 18th -19th century Europe. (shrink)

This essay takes Arthur Danto’s end-of-art thesis as a case in point of a substantive philosophy of history. Such philosophy explains the direction that art has taken and why that direction could not have been different. Danto never scrutinized the philosophy of history that his end-of-art thesis presumes. I aim to do that by drawing a distinction between what I refer to as the common view of history and the philosophical view of history, and by arguing that we need the (...) latter if we want to properly assess the plausibility of the end-of-art thesis. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the historical context and systematic importance of Kant's hypothetical use of reason. It does so by investigating the role of hypotheses in Kant's philosophy of science. We first situate Kant’s account of hypotheses in the context of eighteenth-century German philosophy of science, focusing on the works of Wolff, Meier, and Crusius. We contrast different conceptions of hypotheses of these authors and elucidate the different theories of probability informing them. We then adopt a more systematic perspective to discuss (...) Kant's idea that scientific hypotheses must articulate real possibilities. We argue that Kant's views on the intelligibility of scientific hypotheses constitute a valuable perspective on scientific understanding and the constraints it imposes on scientific rationality. (shrink)

In Het kapitaal beschreef Karl Marx in uiterst schrille kleuren de voorgeschiedenis van de kapitalistische productiewijze. Het was een langdurig proces dat zich over eeuwen uitstrekte en waarbij kleine boeren op gewelddadige wijze van hun primaire productiemiddel, de grond, werden gescheiden en aldus in 'vrije' loonarbeiders veranderd. De kern van dit proces was de privatisering van de meent of commons, de traditioneel voor gemeenschappelijk gebruik bestemde grond.

In 1905 two different microbes were proposed to fill the vacant role of etiologic agent for syphilis, one, the Cytorrhyctes luis, by John Siegel, the other, Spirochaeta pallida, by Fritz Schaudinn. After gathering and reviewing the evidence the majority of medical scientists decided in favor of Schaudinn's candidate. In a previous issue Jean Lindenmann challenged Ludwik Fleck's suggestion that under suitable social conditions Siegel's candidate could just as well have won acceptance by the scientific community (). To refute this counterfactual (...) thesis, Lindenmann presented an asymmetric account of the dispute over the etiology of syphilis. He adopted the view of the proponents that Schaudinn's spirochete had already been there in syphilitic lesions for centuries, only awaiting the discovery of an appropriate staining technique to be revealed. Here a more symmetric analysis of the episode will be attempted, paying serious attention to the arguments put forward by the spirochete's opponents, who expatiated on the many possibilities of inadvertently creating artifacts through microscopic preparation and staining. The symmetric account that is presented in this rejoinder thus aims to trace the simultaneous construction of facts and artifacts. It will not, however, resurrect Fleck's counterfactual thesis. (shrink)

[Masaryk and Korsgaard on God and Moral Obligation: Toward a Moral Argument for the Existence of God].